(Boethius, had he lived in the modern world, would have been a conductor...)
Nunc illud est intuendum, quod omnis ars omnisque etiam disciplina honorabiliorem naturaliter habeat rationem quam artificium, quod manu atque opere exercetur artificis. Multo enim est maius atque auctius scire, quod quisque faciat, quam ipsum illud efficere, quod sciat; etenim artificium corporale quasi serviens famulatur, ratio vero quasi domina imperat. Et nisi manus secundum id, quod ratio sancit, efficiat, frustra sit. Quanto igitur praeclarior est scientia musicae in cognitione rationis quam in opere efficiendi atque actu! Tantum scilicet, quatntum corpus mente superatur; quod scilicet rationis expers servitio degit. Illa vero imperat atque ad rectum deducit. Quod nisi eius pareatur imperio, expers opus rationis titubabit. Unde fit, ut speculatio rationis operandi actu non egeat, manuum vero opera nulla sint, nisi ratione ducantur. Iam vero quanta sit gloria meritumque rationis, hinc itellegi potest, quod ceteri ut ita dicam corporales artifices non ex disciplina sed ex ipsis potius instrumentis cepere vocabula. Nam citharoedus ex cithara, auloedu ex tibia, ceterique suorum instrumentorum vocabulis nuncupantur. Is vero est musicus, qui ratione perpensa canendi scientiam non servitio operis sed imperio speculationis adsumpsit. Quod scilicet in aedificiorum bellorumque opere videmus, in contraria scilicet nuncupatione vocabuli. Eorum namque nominibus vel aedificia inscribuntur vel ducuntur triumphi, quorum imperio ac ratione instituta sunt, non quorum opere servitioque perfecta. Tria igitur genera sunt, quae circa artem musicam versantur. Unum genus est, quod instrumentis agitur, aliud fingit carmina, tertium, quod instrumentorum opus carmenque diiudicat. Sed illud quidem, quod in instrumentis positum est ibique totam operam consumit, ut sunt citharoedi quique organo ceterisque musicae instrumentis artificium probant, a musicae scientiae intellectu seiuncti sunt, quoniam famulantur, ut dictum est; nec quicquam afferunt rationis, sed sunt totius speculationis expertes. Secundum vero musicam agentium genus poetarum est, quod non potius speculatione ac ratione, quam naturali quodam instinctu fertur ad carmen. Atque idcirco hoc quoque genus a musica segregandum est. Tertium est, quod iudicandi peritiam sumit, ut rythmos cantilenasque totumque carmen possit perpendere. Quod scilicet quoniam totum in ratione ac speculatione positum est, hoc proprie musicae deputabitur, isque est musicus, cui adest facultas secundum speculationem rationemve propositam ac musicae conventientem de modis ac rythmis deque generibus cantilenarum ac de permixtionibus ac de omnibus, de quibus posterius explicandum est, ac de poetarum carminibus iudicandi.
Now this ought to be understood, that every art and still every honorable discipline naturally would prefer reason to mere mechanical skill which by the hand and work of artisans is practiced. For it is much better and and more important to know what someone else makes, than to be able to make something which someone else understands; for even as mechanical skill labors like a slave, reason likewise rules as a mistress. And unless that hand acts according to what reason sanctions it basically acts in vain.
How much more beautiful, therefore, is the conception of music in rational understanding than composition and performance! It is clearly as much superior as the mind is superior to the body; since clearly one lacking reason is in servitude. But reason orders and guides to what is correct, since unless reason's authority is obeyed the work (lacking reason) falters.
It happens, therefore, that critical thinking does not require the act of making, but that the mechanical works would be nothing unless they are guided by reason. Therefore how much more be the glory and merit of reason is understood in this, that those that I have thus named "mechanically skilled" not from their discipline but from their instruments themselves take their titles.
For they are "guitarists" from the guitar, "flutists" from the flute, and all the others are named by their own instruments. But the musician is he which takes for himself the knowledge of judging performance not by the servility of work but by the power of analysis.
Of course we see this in the work of architecture and of warfare. For buildings are inscribed and triumphs are led with the names of those by whose power are reason they were guided, not with the names of those by whose hands the work and the battles were completed.
Therefore there are three sorts which work about the art of music. The first type is those who perform on instruments, another which compose songs, and the third are those which judge the performers and the composers. But those to whom performance is given and whose whole work is consumed by it, such as the guitarists and those which on the organ or on other musical instruments ply their trade, are cut off from the understanding of musical knowledge; as was said earlier, they are practically servants. None of them use any reason, but they are entirely without the capacity for thought.
The second type of those making music is of the poets, which are not led by reason and critical thinking so much as by a certain innate instinct to composition. And therefore this type is also separate from the true musicians.
The third type is this, which acquire an expertise in judging, so that they are able to evaluate rhythms and songs and entire compositions. Since clearly this class is wholly grounded in reason and critical thought, it alone is uniquely named the "musical" type, and he is a musician to whom is present the skill to criticize and reason about modes and rhythms and about genres of songs and harmonies, about which has all been explained, and for judging the music of composers.
